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Abstract 
Drawing upon evidence from broader social psychology, and an illustrative empirical study 
of frequency-estimation during a simple sporting ‘observe and recall’ task, this paper makes 
the case for the more thorough investigation of the ‘availability heuristic’ (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1973) on practical state-of-play reasoning in largely observational sporting 
activities. It is argued that this evidence particularly substantiates a need for a more robust 
body of research in two primary domains: (a) the ‘gatekeeping’ tasks pertinent (and usually 
preliminary) to an individual’s sporting performance such as talent scouting, team selection 
and substitution decisions and, (b) the business of officiating in high-tempo environments. 
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Heuristic Reasoning and the Observer’s View: 
The Influence of Example-Availability on ad-hoc Frequency Judgments in Sport 
 Although not entirely ignored, cognitive heuristics have to date been relatively underexplored 
in sport psychology1. Moreover, and as is also true of the broader literature on sporting decision-
making, it is certainly the case that the bulk of heuristics research that has hitherto been completed is 
concerned almost exclusively with sporting performance, and particularly performance in professional 
and elite sports (see, for example, Souchon, Cabagno, Traclet, Trouilloud, & Maio, 2009). This is, in 
many respects, a logical line of focus. Successful skill execution in many forms of high-level, sport-
related task is demonstrably premised to a great degree upon an individual’s ability to evaluate an 
inherently uncertain context and make ‘pressurised decisions’ therein. In a moment-by-moment 
manner, players make high-stakes judgements on the likely outcomes of various prospective courses 
of action. These judgements are themselves premised on practical assessments of what is happening at 
that time, and what has happened previously. It is the contention herein, however, that such decision-
making processes are important at all levels of sport: ‘stakes’ are, after all, relative to the level of 
importance with which an individual or group imbues a situation. Equally, it could well be suggested 
that an understanding of the cognitive dynamics of situated decision-making can provide valuable 
insights not only into sport performance, but also in judgements made about sport performance ‘from 
the sidelines’. The staggeringly diverse impressions that fans, scouts, coaches and so forth appear able 
to form regarding ‘what actually happened’ during a single sporting event have, after all, been a major 
focus for the social psychology of sport since the famous Dartmouth-Princeton football study by 
Hastorf and Cantril (1954). Consequently, the focus of this paper falls upon judgements made during 
the observation of sport. Supporting key assertions with evidence from an empirical study of 
frequency-estimation during a simple sporting ‘observe and recall’ task, the paper advances the 
following central thesis: the influence of cognitive heuristics on reasoning at the most primordial and 
                                                 
1
 Certainly when compared to the rich body of work in the field emanating from mainstream social psychology. 
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ostensibly ‘non-participatory’ sites of sporting involvement makes a clear case for their more 
thorough psychological investigation with respect to two main realms of activity:  
1. The ‘gatekeeping’ tasks pertinent (and usually preliminary) to an individual’s sporting 
performance (e.g. talent scouting, team selection and substitution decisions), and; 
2. The business of officiating in high-tempo environments; 
In both of these, the salient mode of situated decision-making is of central importance.  
Sport and Decision-Making 
To date, human decision-making has been a topic of significant interest in a range of 
academic domains2, with much of the early work in the field being derived largely from the 
economically-oriented game theory of Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944)3. In general 
psychology, these ‘rationalistic’ models are ontologically allied to the econometrics from which they 
arose; this is to say that they are grounded in a tacit assumption that everyday human decisions are 
made through systematic, mathematical and probabilistic reasoning - Bayesian4 process - in an 
endeavour to strategically secure the best possible outcome in any given situation. Progressively, 
however, these models have come to be criticised for promoting an unrealistic image of decision 
making in the real world. Firstly, they treat decision-making as a purely academic exercise, a logic 
game, which is performed almost in a ‘social vacuum’. This fails to take account of the manner in 
which individuals make operational decisions as parts of complex practical tasks and, critically, 
within complex cultural, social and institutional contexts (see Key & Schwartz, 2007; Sharps, Hess, 
& Ranes, 2007; Sharps & Martin, 2002; Thompson, 2003). Secondly, a range of subsequent studies 
                                                 
2
 These domains include economics, mathematics, psychology, and many others. Bell, Raiffa and Tversky (1995) provide an 
extensive review of various such perspectives. 
3
 See also Bicchieri (2004) 
4
 A statistical probability interpretation using the Thomas Bayes formula (see Joyce, 2004). 
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have demonstrated that decision makers in everyday circumstances are often motivated to make a 
decision which would likely provide a ‘good enough’ outcome, rather than to seek a sole, optimal 
solution (Luce, Payne, & Bettman, 1999; Mellers, Schwartz, & Cooke, 1999). Consequently, the 
rationalistic paradigm in the study of decision-making has now been largely supplanted by a new 
range of approaches, more descriptive than predictive in character, which emphasise the personal-
contextual, cognitive and experiential aspects of the ‘deciding process’. These include the more 
normatively-oriented ‘Bounded Rationality’ approach (Simon, 1957), Prospect Theory (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979), the Recognition-Primed Decision model (Klein, 1993) and, central to the argument 
outlined in this paper, the heuristic reasoning approach (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). 
Sport, Decisions and Memory 
In modern sport psychology, the processes involved in decision-making have to date proven a 
rich area for exploration5. Macquet (2009), for example, draws upon the Recognition-Primed 
Decision (RPD) model in articulating how the decisions made by participants in high-level volleyball, 
rather than employing a systematic and rational use of probability estimation, are influenced by three 
key situational factors: the manner in which the situation itself - and its ‘typicality’ - is identified, the 
comparisons that are made with previous experiences, and the use of pre-planning. These findings are 
congruent with those of traditional skill acquisition approaches6 such as Whiting’s information 
processing model (Whiting, 1970) and Schmidt’s schema theory (Schmidt, 1975) which emphasise 
the key role of memory in both decision-making, and the corollary processes of skill execution. More 
recently, meanwhile, the multi-domain work of Ericsson and Kintsch (1995) on the role of long-term 
working memory in the decisions and problem solving activities of experts and ‘skilled performers’ 
has proven highly influential in the psychology of sport. Their focus on the effective accessing of 
                                                 
5
 This review, due to considerations of space, is thus illustrative of major themes, rather than exhaustive. 
6
 In sporting contexts, these models are primarily associated with the acquisition of motor and perceptual skills by sport 
performers.  
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memory as a core part of the decision-making process has important ramifications not only for 
investigation of the activities of skilled athletes, but also other sporting experts such as coaches and 
officials. Indeed, contemporary research demonstrates that coaching, for example, is abound with 
complex and situated decisions (Côté, Salmela, Trudel, Baria, & Russel, 1995; Cushion, 2007; 
Cushion, Armour, & Jones, 2006; Jones & Wallace, 2005), the making of which can be heavily 
influenced by the schemata stored in memories of coaches themselves (Jones & Bowes, 2006). In a 
similar vein, refereeing and umpiring are social practices that, self-evidently, mandate the making of 
‘snap decisions’. Drawing on the Expert Performance approach advocated by Ericsson and Smith 
(1991), MacMahon, Starkes and Deakin (2007) demonstrate that recollections of past experience – 
particularly past experiences as a player – exert a significant influence over the ability of a referee (or, 
indeed, coach) to successfully identify infractions in real-time. 
 Although these approaches display a diversity of focus, there is little doubt that investigation 
of the role of memory in the making of sporting decisions has become a key priority for sport 
psychologists. Over the last forty years, however, a steadily expanding corpus of social cognitive 
research has documented at length how, when performing everyday reasoning tasks on-the-fly, 
individuals rarely, if ever, attempt (or indeed have the option of attempting) a comprehensive retrieval 
and examination of all potentially domain-relevant resources from social memory (Rothman & 
Schwarz, 1998; Winkielman & Schwarz, 2001; Winkielman, Schwarz, & Belli, 1998). More 
commonly, metacognitive ‘short-cutting’ strategies – judgemental heuristics – are employed to 
expedite these tasks (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982). Among the most commonly cited of these 
are the ‘representativeness heuristic’, which describes individuals’ tendency to judge the probability 
of a hypothesis by evaluating the degree to which that hypothesis resembles the data directly available 
(see Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), and the ‘attitude heuristic’, in which truth and falsity judgements 
tend to be directed by pre-existing positive and negative attitudes towards given personalities or issues 
(Pratkanis, 1989). In terms of reasoning under conditions of contextual uncertainty, however, the most 
robustly demonstrated is the availability heuristic, first identified in a series of experimental studies in 
the early 1970s by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman (1973; 1974).  
7 
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Heuristic Reasoning and Example-Availability 
The availability heuristic, in its most basic terms, describes the manner in which situated 
estimations of frequency or probability tend to be inducted from the germane information most 
cognitively salient to an individual, i.e. this order of judgement task is primarily informed by the task-
relevant examples that can be easily recalled. For example, in one of their earliest experiments 
Tversky and Kahneman (1973) themselves noted that, in the English language, the letters ‘K’, ‘L’, 
‘N’, ‘R’ and ‘V’ all appear in more words as the third letter than as the first. When asked to estimate 
rates of such occurrence, however, the significant majority of research participants (by a ratio of 2:1) 
asserted the reverse to be true, on the grounds that examples of words that begin with these letters, on 
the whole, the first letter of a word provides ‘...a better cue for recalling instances than does the third 
letter.’ (Fox, 2006:86). A pertinent, and highly illustrative, field of research with respect to the 
operation of the availability heuristic relates to practical ‘risk assessment’.  In a famous study by 
Lichtenstein et al. (1978), over 75% of American participants estimated that more people die from 
accidents than from strokes, although strokes are almost twice as likely a cause of death as accidents 
in the US. This, the authors surmise, may be an output of greater media reporting7 of accidents than 
strokes, or simply because accidents provide more ‘vivid’ memories; whatever the causal factor(s) 
that make accidents more available to memory, however, the level of skew in the estimates 
themselves clearly demonstrates the availability heuristic at work. We might, with such examples in 
mind, consider the availability heuristic something of a ‘rule of thumb’ mode of reasoning – ‘popular 
induction’ (Nisbett, Borgida, Crandall, & Reed, 1976). Indeed, a number of authors point to the 
manner in which use of the availability heuristic can lead people to classic ‘logical fallacies’, in which 
robust and well-researched evidence is undermined in both the individual and popular consciousness 
by deviant, but familiar, anecdotal examples. However, a cautionary note to sound at this point, and as 
Gerd Gigerenzer (2006) has persuasively argued, is that one should always be guarded when 
                                                 
7
 The link between media reporting and example availability was subsequently interrogated in more robust detail by Combs 
and Slovic (1979). 
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conceptualising heuristics as little more than agents through which human reasoning becomes beset 
by biases and errors. Indeed, it is only possible to do so if we are to directly compare the outputs of 
ad-hoc reasoning tasks with those of formal statistical analysis, an inevitably uneven comparison from 
which the former is unlikely to emerge creditably under the vast majority of circumstances8. Very few 
sports, for example, structurally permit an individual to spend an extended period of time deliberating 
the full range of potential outcomes across a range of possible scenarios before choosing their course 
of action. In cricket or baseball, for example, where the player batting often has to contend with a ball 
moving at over ninety miles per hour, a very limited period indeed is available in which to select a 
shot that is likely to be profitable to play. Similarly, when making an in-the-field ‘snap’ judgement 
regarding the state of play at any given moment, a sporting official rarely has the luxury of an 
extended deliberation period. The use of some form of evidence-based systematic probability calculus 
within restricted timeframes is simply not an option. What is perhaps, then, most striking about 
heuristic reasoning in general is that it is an ‘adaptive tool’ (Gigerenzer, 2006) capable of producing 
surprisingly and consistently effective on-the-spot judgements. Heuristics – to this extent – are not 
‘parasites’ on human reason, but prime features of it. With this in mind, it is this paper’s explicit aim 
henceforth to (a) explore the relevance of the availability heuristic itself in sporting contexts - as a 
means of illuminating the potent connections between the availability of information in memory and 
situated reasoning tasks - but also (b) to do so in a manner that does not assume that the reasoning 
process itself is inherently ‘flawed’.  
Availability and the ‘Schwarz Paradigm’ 
A major advance in the understanding of the availability heuristic arose initially in the work 
of Schwarz et al. (1991), which proposes that much work in the field had failed to ‘...disentangle the 
impact of content of recall and of the subjective experience of ease or difficulty that may accompany 
                                                 
8
 Moreover, if a judgement being made is important, and the option of deliberation time is available, there is a very good 
chance that an individual would not rely upon ad-hoc heuristic reasoning to make that judgement anyway. 
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recall.’ (p. 195). In short, it is necessary to understand whether reasoning is more, respectively, 
contingent upon the overall number of examples that can be recalled, or the understood ease with 
which examples come to mind. Across three experimental studies, the authors found clear evidence to 
suggest that categories of event are assessed to be more common, and thus more likely to occur, when 
‘...instances more easily come to mind, even when a smaller absolute number of instances are 
generated.’ (Fox, 2006, p. 86). For example, in the first of these studies, Schwarz et al. (1991) devised 
a test to explore the supposition that if an individual finds a examples actively difficult to recall, they 
are likely to assume that the examples ‘cannot be typical’ and downgrade their assessment of its 
frequency or probability of occurrence in line with this. Students were asked to think of examples of 
occasions on which they had been assertive, and then list either six such occasions from memory (a 
relatively easy task) or twelve (a relatively difficult one). The students who listed six examples tended 
to subsequently rank themselves as more assertive than those asked to list twelve, despite the latter 
group recurrently recalling more actual examples overall than the former. This pattern of findings was 
repeated when asking students to find examples of unassertive behaviour; those that easily recalled six 
examples were more liable to judge themselves unassertive than those that struggled to recall twelve. 
Thus: 
 
‘...the content of recall affected self-judgments in the direction of the valence of 
the recalled behaviors only if the recall process itself was experienced as easy. If 
the recall process elicited experiences of difficulty, on the other hand, the content 
of recall affected self-judgments in a direction opposite to the implications of the 
recalled behaviors.’ (Schwarz, et al., 1991, p. 197) 
 
This proposition has (subsequent to the original work of Schwarz and colleagues) been corroborated 
by research on a number of phenomena involving probability and frequency judgements, such as self-
evaluation of memory capacity (Winkielman, et al., 1998), and susceptibility to health problems 
10 
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(Rothman & Schwarz, 1998). As previously outlined, however, exploration of general heuristic 
reasoning in sport psychology – and the availability heuristic in particular – has to date been rather 
limited in terms of total research conducted, and also in terms scope, with the bulk of papers attending 
almost exclusively to the issue of athletic performance (such as Bennis & Pachur, 2006). One of the 
best contemporary examples of work outside of the direct athlete-performance realm, however, is the 
work of Souchon et al. (2009), in which the ‘sporting’ and ‘disciplinary’ decisions of referees in 
handball matches, at both League and National levels, are evaluated in terms of a range of 
judgemental heuristics. In terms of sporting decisions, the authors describe how: 
‘...referees avoided giving the relatively minor...sporting intervention at the 
higher standard of competition. This finding is consistent with the notion that a 
high standard of competition involves greater flow, thus effective refereeing is 
characterized by fewer interventions.’ (p. 699)  
With respect to disciplinary judgements, meanwhile: 
‘...the standard of competition interacted with the ambiguity of the offence to 
predict the disciplinary decision. Surprisingly, the more ambiguous fouls were 
punished as severely at a high standard of competition as at the low standard, 
while the more obvious fouls were penalized differently according to the standard 
of competition. After the obvious fouls, referees opted for fewer suspensions at a 
high standard of competition than at a lower standard.’ (p. 700) 
The study demonstrates with clarity that, when making both types of decision, referees use ‘standard 
of competition’ itself as a heuristic; their pre-held stereotypes regarding what could and should occur 
at different levels of sport effectively short-cut the need to fully recall and evaluate any given set of 
circumstances in reaching a quick conclusion.  
11 
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In order to illustrate the core themes discussed above in a thematically relevant manner, a 
frequency estimation study was conducted, with a view to assessing the influence of the availability 
heuristic on participant reasoning during a simple sporting ‘observe and recall’ task. Drawing upon 
existing research, the study design embedded measurement of participant frequency-estimation with 
respect to two factors that might inform ‘vividness’. Firstly, as documented by McKelvie (1995; 
1997; 2000), account was taken of the fact that famous or well-known examples of a phenomenon can 
provide significant cues to memory, with resultant over-estimation of the quantity or frequency of its 
overall occurrence. Secondly, and as Tversky & Kahnemann (1973) demonstrate, personal familiarity 
or involvement with a phenomenon can also influence estimates in much the same way.  
 
Method 
Participants 
With institutional ethical approval, undergraduate students reading for sport-related degrees 
(N=141) were invited to participate in the study. All those invited (42 women, 99 men, Mage = 20.1 
years, age range: 18-36 years) consented to be involved. 
Materials 
A show of 50 slides was prepared, lasting a total of 3 minutes. Each slide was shown for the 
same duration as all others, and contained a photographic image of one of five sports being played: 
association football, tennis, running, golf or netball. These slides were balanced in terms of overall 
quantities (N=10 for each sport), and the sports themselves were distributed evenly across the show to 
compensate for the effects of primacy/recency on participant recall (see Sousa, 2006). For the slides 
containing images of association football and tennis, action shots of well-known athletes in the 
pertinent sports were shown (henceforth ‘celebrity sports’). For the remaining slides, ‘generic’ action 
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shots were used; images showed non-famous athletes taking part in running, golf and netball 
(henceforth ‘non-celebrity sports’). 
Procedure 
Participants were initially asked to make a note of the sport in which they themselves were 
most heavily involved, and then to view the slideshow detailed above (with no indication made 
regarding the nature of subsequent tasks). Immediately upon the slideshow’s conclusion, participants 
were asked to complete, within a window of 45 seconds, a survey indicating which sports they had 
seen, and how many slides pertinent to each of these there had been in the show. As such, it was 
postulated that, within the pressurised timeframe: 
a. In line with the work of McKelvie (2000), participants would produce statistically greater 
mean frequency estimations for occurrences of the celebrity sports than the non-celebrity 
sports, even though, in reality, there were equal numbers of all five sports displayed during 
the slideshow, and/or: 
b. In line with the work of Tversky & Kahnemann (1973), a positive relationship would emerge 
between the sports in which the participants themselves were primarily involved and higher 
frequency estimations of the occurrence of that sport in the slideshow. 
Data Analysis 
Data were initially examined for normality using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. The 
assumption of normality was not met; therefore a non-parametric approach was employed. A 
Friedman test was utilised to explore whether differences existed in participant frequency-estimation 
between the five different sports (football, FB; tennis TNS, netball NB, running, RNG; and golf, 
GLF), followed by a Wilcoxon signed-ranks test with Bonferroni adjustment to compare the overall 
means of celebrity and non-celebrity sports. Spearman’s correlation (ρ) was carried out to examine for 
relationships between the sports in which the participants were primarily involved and their estimated 
frequency of occurrence in the slideshow. All data are presented as mean ± SD unless otherwise 
13 
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stated. Significance level was set at p < 0.05. All statistical analyses were conducted using SPSS 
v15.0.  
 
Results. 
The Friedman test revealed a significant overall difference (p < 0.001) between celebrity and non-
celebrity sports. Bonferroni adjustment produced a significance value of 0.005 to be used for all the 
comparisons. FB was not significantly different (p = 0.166) to TNS. However, they were both 
significantly different to all other (non-celebrity) sports (P < 0.005). There were no significant 
differences between the other sports (see Figure 1).    
 
Figure 1: Estimated frequency of sport presented. Data presented as means. Vertical bars 
denote SD. FB, football, TNS, tennis; NB, netball; RNG running; GLF, golf. ‘a’ indicates 
significant difference with FB, while ‘b’ with TNS. 
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Finally, there were no significant correlations between the sports in which participants were 
‘primarily involved’ and their estimates of the frequency of occurrence of these sports within the 
slideshow, nor were there demonstrably divergent trends along lines of gender or age. 
 
Discussion. 
The findings described confirm the first of the two postulated outcomes above. Although the sports 
displayed in the slides occurred in equal numbers (N=10 for all), mean frequency estimations were 
substantially greater for the celebrity sports, football (13.24) and tennis (12.79), than for the non-
celebrity sports, netball (10.17), running (10.10) and golf (10.60). In short, while participants’ mean 
estimations of the frequencies of occurrence of non-celebrity sports in the slideshow were very 
accurate indeed (a combined mean of 10.29), mean estimations of the occurrence for the celebrity 
sports (a combined mean of 13.01) were inflated by over 30%. There was, however, no statistically 
significant relationship between participants’ frequency estimations and their own involvement in 
particular sports. This indicates that, within the sample: 
a. Participants utilised the availability heuristic in making time-pressurised frequency-
estimations, sizeably over-estimating the frequency of occurrence of those sports linked 
to more vivid examples. 
b. The involvement of well-known athletes in the some of the viewed sports provided a 
much stronger cue to memory (i.e. were more ‘vivid’) than either the sports themselves, 
or the participants’ own personal involvement in particular sports. 
c. The presence of ‘more vivid’ examples did not, however, lead to any substantial 
counterbalancing underestimation of the frequency of occurrence of those sports linked to 
less vivid examples. 
Of course, the nature of the sample itself (a set of individuals that could reasonably be expected to 
recognise the ‘sporting celebrities’ as exactly that) is a key factor herein. As has been observed in a 
15 
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variety of studies to date, however, there is always an interpretative/experiential quality to how an 
individual constitutes ‘vividness’ in any case of a ‘thing’ (McKelvie, 2000). The research reported 
above, if repeated using a sample of participants with rather less interest and/or experience in (and 
therefore knowledge of) sport, would likely have produced very different results. The proposed ‘fame’ 
of the athletes would simply not be a good cue to memory if the participants themselves did not 
actually recognise those athletes, though one should always be mindful that the parameters of a 
concept such as ‘fame’ are not themselves always easy to delineate. An athlete such as David 
Beckham, for example, may have initially gained fame in association football but his subsequent 
career trajectory now renders him internationally recognisable to many people with no knowledge of 
sport whatsoever, but who may preserve strong interests in fashion or ‘celebrity culture’ at large. 
Consequently, circumspection should always be exercised when prejudging what might, or might not, 
provide strong cues to memory among given populations. It may well, for example, have been 
reasonable to expect the regular golfers in the sample to provide higher estimations of the number of 
golf-related slides in the show; this was, however, not the case. The recognisability of the footballers 
and tennis players in the slideshow clearly provided a stronger cue to memory among these 
participants than their own identification with golf itself.  
Many judgements in ‘non-participatory’ sporting activities involve, or are premised upon, 
individuals making quantity or frequency estimations regarding what has recently happened, or is 
happening. As outlined in the introduction to this paper, there are two general domains for which 
these observations have particular import, which are now discussed in turn. 
‘Gatekeeping’ Tasks 
There is little doubt that individuals involved in ‘gatekeeping’ activities in sport, i.e. those 
responsible for the access of others to particular arenas such as talent scouts, coaches and team 
selectors, are often called upon to make snap judgements grounded in ‘state of play’ assessments. 
Although these are not always subject to the same degrees of time-pressurisation as those made by in-
game officials (see below), the circumstances of such judgements, not least those made by coaches, 
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still largely take place within limiting timeframes and against a variety of contextual backdrops such 
as competition, training and organisation tasks (Côté, et al., 1995). As aforementioned, recent research 
has portrayed coaching as a complex decision making process (Abraham, Collins, & Martindale, 
2006; Jones & Standage, 2006) which is influenced by a myriad of social and psychological factors 
(Cushion, 2007; Cushion, et al., 2006; Jones & Wallace, 2005). In practice a key aspect of the 
decision making of coaches is the process of observing athletic performance to enable the use of 
coaching knowledge to implement practical interventions such as providing feedback, substitutions 
and tactical adjustments to aid athlete outcomes (Côté & Gilbert, 2009). Smith and Cushion (2006), 
for example, report that in-game, youth soccer coaches spend 40.38% of their time in silence during 
which they perform ‘...a number of cognitive processes, which included individual player analysis as 
well as team tactical analysis’ (Smith & Cushion, 2006). Pertinently for coaching practice itself, 
results from this study suggest that observation under time pressure in sport is potentially not a 
quantifiably accurate or reliable measure if the availability heuristic is in play. Indeed results have 
shown how a social factor such as ‘celebrity’ quantifiably may distort accurate recall even among 
knowledgeable observers. This upholds the notion of coaching as a complex decision making process 
which is subject to variegated social influences and questions the efficacy of pure (no matter how 
focused) observation as a basis for sound decision-making. Furthermore it raises considerable issues 
for active coaches who utilise ‘intuitive’ decision making when completing tasks such as such as 
substitutions and in-game tactical adjustments under time pressure, as these may well be shown have 
a basis in a quantitatively skewed estimate regarding the character of prior events. Given the apparent 
influence of heuristics on recall in sport, coaching practitioners may wish to consider the use of 
systematic performance analysis, a burgeoning area (Hughes & Franks, 2008) to support accurate 
time-pressured decision making.  
Officiating 
Despite a widely-held desire for error-free decision-making from officials in association 
football (Lane, Nevill, Ahmad, & Balmer, 2006),  officials have been shown to make decisions 
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influenced by, for example, such apparently arbitrary variables as the height of player (Quaquebeke & 
Giessner, 2010), the colour of a player’s shirt (Frank & Gilovich, 1988; Tiryaki, 2005) and the level 
and type of crowd noise (Nevill, Balmer, & Williams, 2002). If we consider, however, the particular 
pressures of time limitation on an official’s decision-making, it is possible to hypothesise that all such 
vivid stimuli may simply render particular cases-of-event easier to recall at the moment that the 
decision is made. Cautions issued on the grounds of ‘persistent infringement’, for example, require an 
official to make a situated judgement regarding the overall quantity of infractions committed by a 
single player within a broad melee of activity. To keep a full count of all such infractions committed 
within a single game by all players would, without the benefit of perfect recall, be extremely difficult, 
and progressively more difficult as the clock advances. As such, it is reasonable to expect that some 
kind of shortcutting strategy would need to be employed and, moreover, that some infractions, classes 
of infraction and characteristics of infracting player are more vivid in memory than others. In cases 
where  the distribution of this mode of caution can be found to be inconsistent with the actual 
numbers of infractions committed (i.e. where some players receive ‘persistent infraction’ cautions 
despite other players having transgressed more often), a systematic analysis should reveal the classes 
of cue responsible for the overestimation in given officials. The findings of Findlay & Ste-Marie 
(2004), for example, demonstrate a clear ‘reputation bias’ among sporting officials; decisions are 
often made in line with prior knowledge regarding the ‘type’ of athlete involved. If, therefore, 
infractions committed by an athlete ‘known’ to be aggressive provide an official with more vivid 
examples of transgressive behaviour than infractions committed by athletes without such a reputation, 
there is a very real danger of emergent ‘self-fulfilling prophecies’. Essentially, overestimation of 
infraction-frequency borne of an athlete’s reputation may well lead to public disciplinary action which 
serves, in turn, to further contribute to that reputation. This mode of spiral can only be effectively 
halted through intervention designed to rebalance the manner in which officials themselves manage 
and understand the roles of particular cues.  
Conclusions and Future Research 
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The full impact of the pioneering work of Tversky and Kahneman (1973), and Schwarz et al. 
(1991), has yet to be felt in the academic study of sport. Evidence from the broader realm of social 
psychology, and the illustrative study presented herein, indicate that there is much scope in sport 
psychology for a more thorough investigation of cognitive heuristics in general, and the availability 
heuristic in particular. Moreover, this scope need not be confined to (expert) performance studies, but 
should embrace a wide range of sport-related activities, not least coaching, scouting and officiating. 
Domain-specific and rigorous research is required to facilitate a better understanding not only of 
where the availability heuristic is in use in sporting activity, and its order of influence on judgements 
made, but also which factor(s) most strongly inform(s) the very vividness of a recalled example. A 
richer and more robust body of evidence relating to these matters has direct implications for not only 
the better academic understanding of the formulation of sporting ‘state of play’ judgements, but also 
bears the potential to inform a range of practical intervention strategies.   
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